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Abstract
Path-dependence in coordination games may lead to lock-in on inefficient outcomes,
such as adoption of inferior technologies (Arthur, 1989) or inefficient economic institutions
(North, 1990). We aim to find conditions under which lock-in is overcome by developing
a solution concept that makes ex-ante predictions about the adaptation process following
lock-in. We assume that some players are myopic, forming beliefs according to fictitious
play, while others are sophisticated, anticipating the learning process of the myopic play-
ers. We propose a solution concept based on a Nash equilibrium of the strategies chosen
by sophisticated players. Our model predicts that no players would switch from the ef-
ficient to the inefficient action, but deviations in the other direction are possible. Three
types of equilibria may exist: in the first type lock-in is sustained, while in the other
two types lock-in is overcome. We determine the existence conditions for each of these
equilibria and show that the equilibria in which lock-in is overcome are more likely and
the transition is faster when sophisticated players have a longer planning horizon, or when
the history of inefficient coordination is shorter.
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1 Introduction
One of the central problems of game theory is equilibrium selection in games with multiple
Nash equilibrium. The problem is even more difficult in repeated games, where usual solution
concepts permit a diverse set of sequences to be played on the equilibrium path. Any repetition
of a stage game Nash equilibria could be supported by some subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,
but even miscoordination can occur at the start of the game if the players are using strategies
that implement efficient coordination only following such miscoordination. One reason for
the multiplicity of equilibria is the lack of history dependence. As an example, consider
figure 1 that represents two stages of a repeated game between players 1 and 2. Subgames
starting at nodes 1b and 1c for player 1 are identical1, therefore if there is an equilibrium that
supports an action for player A in node 1b, there will also be an equilibrium that supports
this action in node 1c. Nash equilibrium requires mutually consistent beliefs and actions
but places no restrictions on how beliefs should depend on observed history. However, even
though expecting the same action to be played is just as rational as expecting a different
action (Goodman, 1983), there is robust experimental evidence that choices and beliefs do
depend on past play, especially in games with multiple stable states (Van Huyck et al., 1990;
Romero, 2015). We use this evidence to place additional restrictions on the belief formation
process and develop a solution concept that depends on past play and refines the predictions
of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
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Figure 1: Two stages of a repeated two player game, where the first number indicates the
player to whom the node belongs. End nodes display payoffs from the second stage.
1Except for the accumulated earnings that play no role under the standard assumptions of risk neutrality
and selfishness.
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Instead of using solution concepts, such as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we could
use learning models, which make predictions about the path of play based on outcomes in
previous rounds. However, in learning models (see Fudenberg and Levine, 1998, Camerer,
2003) choices are determined only by observed history, ignoring the structure of upcoming
rounds. In this paper the belief formation assumed in learning models is combined with an
equilibrium concept to define a solution concept that takes into account both the observed
history and the structure of future rounds.
Players in our model are assumed to be either “myopic” or “sophisticated”. Myopic players
behave as predicted by adaptive learning models: they form beliefs about the actions of
other players, update beliefs based on observed history and choose a myopic best response.
Sophisticated players have a certain planning horizon and compare payoffs of action plans that
prescribe an action for each point in time within this planning horizon. We also assume that
sophisticated players anticipate the learning process of myopic players and know about other
sophisticated players, therefore our solution concept requires action plans of sophisticated
players to be mutual best responses to each other.
One advantage of our solution concept is the ability to make predictions following a particular
history of choices. Specifically, we are interested in convergence to an efficient state following
previous coordination on an inefficient state. Standard solution concepts abstract from ex-
perience that players have prior to the game, although there is robust experimental evidence
that behavioral spillovers occur if players experience the same game with different parameters
(Romero, 2015, Kamijo et al., 2015) or if two different games are played consecutively (Deve-
tag, 2005, Dolan and Galizzi, 2015). Likewise, in many real life situations decisions are made
repeatedly and choices are sensitive to conventions that have been established in the past. It
is important to have a theory that could explain how transitions to an efficient state depend
on the history of play, but existing models are not able to do that. An adaptive learning
model with a deterministic choice rule predicts that no player deviates from an inefficient
state once it has been reached. In a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium the history of previous
interactions plays no role. A model presented in this paper combines the two approaches
and predicts that a transition from an inefficient to the efficient state can occur if certain
conditions are satisfied, while transitions in the opposite direction never occur.
Our model also predicts that some players may deviate from an inefficient state, but none
will deviate from the efficient one, therefore the efficient state is absorbing and there is a
unique point in time when play transitions from the inefficient to the efficient state. For
sophisticated players action paths that prescribe a switch from an efficient to an inefficient
action are dominated, therefore sophisticated players will switch to the efficient action at most
once. We calculate how such action plans of sophisticated players affect the switching period
of myopic players, and how the latter affects sophisticated player payoffs. This mapping from
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sophisticated player action plans to payoffs is then used to determine the combinations of
action plans that are mutual best responses to each other.
It is important to know whether inefficient lock-in (Arthur, 1989) can be overcome, and how
the conditions can be changed to improve the chances of an efficiency-enhancing transition.
We show that three types of equilibria may exist in the repeated game: in a “teaching
equilibrium” sophisticated players switch to the efficient action at the start of the game, and
myopic players switch later. In an “interior equilibrium” sophisticated players initially play
the inefficient action, but switch to the efficient one and are subsequently followed by myopic
players. In a “delay” equilibrium all sophisticated players choose the inefficient action for the
entire duration of the game, and myopic players never switch. Inefficient lock-in is therefore
overcome in the first two types of equilibria, but not in the third one. Point predictions cannot
be made because of the multiplicy of equilibria, therefore instead we show how the speed of
transition and the types of equilibria that exist respond to changes in game parameters.
We find that as the planning horizon of sophisticated players increases, the teaching and
the interior equilibria are more likely to exist, while the delay equilibrium is less likely. A
longer history of inefficient coordination makes teaching equilibrium less likely and delays
transitions. The effect of player composition is ambiguous: on one hand, a larger number of
sophisticated players leads to a faster transition and higher profits in the teaching and interior
equilibria, reducing incentives to completely stop teaching. On the other hand, as the number
of sophisticated players grows, one player’s actions have a smaller effect on myopic players,
increasing incentives to delay teaching and leading to a potential breakdown of a teaching
equilibrium.
Several other studies have extended the adaptive learning model with sophistication in dif-
ferent ways. Camerer et al. (2002a) and Camerer et al. (2002b) propose a sophisticated
experience-weighted attraction (EWA) model in which some players are adaptive and learn
using adaptive EWA, while others are sophisticated, anticipate how adaptive players learn and
use strategic teaching. While conceptually this paper is similar to the model of sophisticated
EWA, we develop a solution concept that can be used to make ex-ante predictions about the
path of play in the game, while the parameters of sophisticated EWA can be estimated only
ex-post. Ellison (1997) models a population of adaptive players, learning according to ficti-
tious play, repeatedly matched in pairs to play a binary choice coordination game. Adding one
rational player to the population of adaptive players can change the outcome from coordina-
tion on the inefficient equilibrium to coordination on the efficient one, as long as the number
of players is fixed and the rational player is patient enough. Acemoglu and Jackson (2011)
develop an overlapping generations model that shows how a social norm of low cooperation
can be overturned by a single forward-looking player. Schipper (2011) uses an optimal control
model with two players and shows how a strategic player can control an adaptive player in
repeated games with strategic substitutes or strategic complements. Mengel (2014) studies
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adaptive players who are also forward-looking and finds that in two-player coordination games
the efficient equilibrium may be stochastically stable, in contrast to the the case with only
adaptive players.
2 Sophisticated Player Equilibrium
Consider n players, indexed by i ∈ N ≡ {1, 2, . . . , n}, who play a repeated game in continuous
time by choosing an action from a stage game action space {A,B}. We denote the time at
which the game starts by 0, the duration of the remaining game by T¯ and the duration
of observed history by T ′, with T¯ , T ′ ∈ (0,∞). We implement the history of inefficient
coordination by assuming that prior to time 0 only action B has been chosen.
We assume two types of players: m players are myopic and n−m players are sophisticated.
Throughout the paper we will index sophisticated players by s ∈ S and myopic players by
i ∈ N \ S. The two types of players follow different choice rules, respectively denoted by ai
and as, which prescribe an action for each moment in time. We will refer to ai as a choice
function and to as as an action plan. Denote the action of player i at time t by ai(t) and
the action of player s by as(t), where action A is coded as 1 and action B is coded as 0.
Denote the combination of actions of all players except i by a−i(t) = ×j∈N\{i}aj(t), with
a−i(t) ∈ A−i, and denote the combination of actions of all sophisticated players except s
by a−s(t) = ×j∈S\{s}aj(t), with a−s(t) ∈ A−s. The payoff flow for player i at time t is
pii(ai(t),×j∈N\{i}aj(t)). Similarly, denote the combination of choice functions of all myopic
players except i by a−i = ×j∈{N\S}\{i}aj and the combination of action plans for all sophis-
ticated players except s by a−s = ×j∈S\{s}aj .
The difference between a choice function for myopic players and an action plan for sophis-
ticated players lies in how these functions are determined: choices of myopic players are
determined by the history of play while the choices of sophisticated players must be optimal
given the choices of all other players. Before specifying these two function we first have to
define the beliefs and expected payoffs of myopic players.
Belief of a myopic player is a probability assigned to the event that a randomly chosen
other group member chooses action A. Denote the belief of player i at time t by xi(t). Belief
formation is assumed to follow a one parameter weighted fictitious play model,2 proposed
by Cheung and Friedman (1997). The original weighted fictitious play model is specified for
two player games and we extend it to N -person games by assuming that a joint distribution
2Fictitious play corresponds to Bayesian updating of the probability that any group member will choose
A, using a Dirichlet prior and assuming that the choice of each group member was independently drawn from
the distribution about which players are learning.
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of choices is used to form beliefs about the actions of group members, but players do not
distinguish between the identities of others.3 Beliefs are therefore homogeneous (Rapoport,
1985; Rapoport and Eshed-Levy, 1989): a single belief is formed about the probability that
any other player will choose A. The fictitious play rule used to calculate myopic player beliefs
is as follows:
xi(t) =
∫ t
k=0 γ
k
∑
j∈N\{i}
aj(t−k)
n−1 dk∫ t+T ′
k=0 γ
k dk
(1)
The integral in the numerator measures the weighted length of time in which action A has
been observed, determined by the action plans of other group members. Observations prior to
time 0 play no role because we assume that prior to time 0 only action B has been observed.
The γ parameter measures the rate at which old observations are forgotten. We assume that
γ ∈ (0, 1), where values close to 1 indicate that all past observations are given similar weights,
while values close to 0 indicate that only the most recent experience is taken into account.
Expected payoffs of myopic players associated with each pure action are determined by
beliefs xi(t), which are used to assign a probability to each action profile of other group
members:
Epii(a, xi(t)) =
∑
a−i∈A−i
[Pr(a−i(t) = a−i|xi(t))× pii(a, a−i)] =
=
∑
a−i∈A−i
[xi(t)
(
∑
a−i)(1− xi(t))(n−1−
∑
a−i) × pii(a, a−i)], ∀a ∈ {1, 0} (2)
Choice function ai(t,×s∈S as) prescribes an action for a myopic player i at any point in time
t ∈ [0, T¯ ], conditional on the profile of action plans chosen by sophisticated players, ×s∈S as.
We assume that myopic players choose the action that maximizes immediate expected utility
and ties are broken in favour of action A:
ai(t,×s∈Sas) =
{
1 if Epii(1, xi(t)) ≥ Epii(0, xi(t))
0 otherwise
(3)
3There are several other ways how weighted fictitious play could be extended to N -person games. One
way could be to assume that players form beliefs about the joint distribution of the actions of all others and
update it using observed aggregate feedback: for example, Crawford (1995) assumes that players form beliefs
and observe feedback about an order statistic of all the choices. Another way is to assume that separate beliefs
are formed about every other player j based on the empirical distribution of j’s choices (e.g. Monderer and
Shapley, 1996). We combine the two approaches by assuming that players use the joint distribution of choices
to form beliefs about the action of any opponent, but do not distinguish between their identities.
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Action plans chosen by sophisticated players, ×s∈S as, are explicitly included in the choice
function to make it transparent that myopic player actions can be affected by sophisticated
players. Note that the choice function depends only on the current round payoffs and beliefs,
which are determined by observed history, therefore it is possible to anticipate myopic player
choices at any history.
Sophisticated players anticipate the learning process of myopic players and are also far-
sighted, thus at time 0 they choose an action plan for the interval [0, T ], where T is the length
of the planning horizon of sophisticated players.
Action plan as prescribes an action for a sophisticated player s at any point in time t ∈ [0, T ].
Denote the set of all action plans by As. The action plan is assumed to be an open-loop
strategy, which depends only on time and not on observed history. Sophisticated players face
no strategic uncertainty about the actions of myopic players, but they do face uncertainty
about the actions of other sophisticated players. Payoffs associated with an action plan as
depend on the vector of action plans of other sophisticated players, a−s, and on the choices
of myopic players, whose choice function ai(t, as × a−s) also depends on the action plans of
all sophisticated players. The total payoff that a sophisticated player expects to earn over the
period of length T is calculated as follows:
Π(as, a−s, ai(·, as × a−s)) =
∫ T
0
pi[as(t), a−s(t)× ai(t, as × a−s)]dt (4)
Since sophisticated players choose action plans and face no strategic uncertainty about the
actions of myopic players, the game can be reduced to a static game between sophisticated
players. Theoretical predictions in static games are typically made using a Nash equilibrium,
so we follow the convention and require that sophisticated players choose action plans that
are mutual best responses to each other.
Definition 1. A combination of action plans ×s∈S a∗s is a symmetric sophisticated player
equilibrium if for each player s ∈ S, a∗s satisfies
Π(a∗s, a
∗
−s, ai(·, a∗s, a∗−s)) ≥ Π(as, a∗−s, ai(·, as, a∗−s)), ∀as ∈ As (5)
and a∗s = a
∗
j , ∀s, j ∈ S
and ai(·, as, a−s) is defined in (3).
If there were no myopic players, equation (5) would reduce to the standard Nash equilibrium.
If all players were myopic, equation (5) would not apply, and the choices of all players would
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be calculated using the belief learning model. We will look at an intermediate case where
both myopic and sophisticated players are present.
In the remainder of the paper we will characterize the symmetric sophisticated player equi-
libria for a repeated N -person critical mass coordination game.
3 Sophisticated Player Equilibrium in a Critical Mass Game
We are interested in determining conditions under which an inefficient convention could be
replaced by an efficient one. One way how such a transition could take place is by strategic
choice: sophisticated players could attempt to teach other players to play according to the
efficient convention. To determine conditions under which such strategic teaching is possible
we will characterize symmetric sophisticated player equilibria following lock-in to an inefficient
state.
3.1 Critical Mass Game
Recall that we defined a sophisticated player equilibrium for a class of games with n players
and an action space {A,B}. A special class of such games is a critical mass game, in which
payoffs of each player depend on their action, ai(t) and on the total number of other group
members who chose action A at time t, denoted by r(a−i, t) =
∑
j∈N\{i} aj(t), with r(a−i, t) ∈
{0, 1, . . . , n− 1}. The payoff flow for player i at time t is defined as follows:
pi(ai(t), a−i(t)) =

H if r(a−i, t) ≥ θ and ai(t) = 1
0 if r(a−i, t) < θ and ai(t) = 1
M if r(a−i, t) ≥ θ and ai(t) = 0
L if r(a−i, t) < θ and ai(t) = 0
(6)
To have a coordination game, we assume that H > M and L > 0. The coordination require-
ment is determined by an exogenous threshold θ: action A generates a larger payoff than B
if and only if at least θ other group members choose A. There are two stable states4 in pure
strategies if one point in time is considered in isolation: in the first stable state all players
choose A and in the second one all players choose B. We assume that states are Pareto-ranked
and define coordination on A as an efficient state by assuming that H > L. Finally, we assume
that M ≥ L, so that players who choose B also prefer a situation in which the threshold has
been exceeded.
4We will use the term “state” rather than “equilibrium” when referring to a Nash equilibrium in a stage
game to avoid confusion with the sophisticated player equilibrium.
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Assumption 1: H > M ≥ L > 0.
We assume that there are at least 2 sophisticated players so that an equilibrium could be
defined using equation 5. We also assume that the number of myopic players is sufficiently
large to implement the efficient state, and the number of sophisticated players is small enough
so that sophisticated players on their own could not implement the efficient state. If the latter
condition was not satisfied, a sophisticated player equilibrium would reduce to the standard
Nash equilibrium because sophisticated players would not need to take into account the
learning process of myopic players.
Assumption 2: 2 ≤ n−m < θ ≤ m.
3.2 Choice Function of Myopic Players
Myopic players form beliefs about the actions of other players and choose an action that
maximizes immediate payoffs. In this subsection we specify the choice function ai(t, as) that
prescribes an action for player i at time t when sophisticated players are choosing action plans
×s∈Sas (for brevity, we will omit the subscript under the product sign).
Proposition 1. Suppose that in a game with payoffs defined by (6) at time t myopic player
i holds beliefs xi(t). Then the choice function from (3) simplifies to:
ai(t,×as) =
 1 if xi(t) ≥ I
−1
L
L+H−M
(θ, n− θ)
0 otherwise
(7)
where I−1 is the inverse of an incomplete regularized beta function.
Proof.
From (3), action A is chosen if the expected payoff of A at time t exceeds the expected payoff
of B:
ai(t) = 1⇔ Epi(1, xi(t)) ≥ Epi(0, xi(t)) (8)
In a critical mass game payoff depends only on the chosen action and on whether the number
of other group members who chose A exceeds θ. Denote the subjective probability assigned
to the latter event by Pr[r(a−i, t) ≥ θ|xi(t)]. Then expected payoffs in equation (2) can be
defined as:
Epi(1, xi(t)) = 0× (1− Pr[r(a−i, t) ≥ θ|xi(t)]) +H × Pr[r(a−i, t) ≥ θ|xi(t)]
Epi(0, xi(t)) = L× (1− Pr[r(a−i, t) ≥ θ|xi(t)]) +M × Pr[r(a−i, t) ≥ θ|xi(t)] (9)
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The subjective probability that the threshold will be exceeded is calculated by adding the
probabilities assigned to all action profiles of other players in which more than θ players
choose A:
Pr[r(a−i, t) ≥ θ|xi(t)] =
n−1∑
k=θ
(xi(t))
k(1− xi(t))n−1−k
(
n− 1
k
)
(10)
Use equations (9) and (10) to rewrite (8) the following way:
ai(t) = 1⇔
n−1∑
k=θ
(xi(t))
k(1− xi(t))n−1−k
(
n− 1
k
)
≥ L
L+H −M (11)
Notation in (11) is simplified using the definition of an incomplete regularized beta function:5
ai(t) = 1⇔ Ix(t)(θ, n− θ) ≥
L
L+H −M (12)
Taking the inverse of (12) and substituting into (3) leads to the desired expression:
ai(t,×as) =
 1 if xi(t) ≥ I
−1
L
L+H−M
(θ, n− θ)
0 otherwise

Proposition 1 states that a myopic player chooses A instead of B if his probabilistic belief
exceeds I−1 L
L+H−M
(θ, n− θ), a threshold value that depends only on the game parameters. For
brevity, we will refer to this threshold value by I−1. We should note that the properties of
inverse regularized beta functions imply that I−1 is increasing in L, M and θ, but decreasing
in H and n.
Proposition 1 shows that myopic player actions can be determined by comparing their beliefs
to a threshold value that is fixed in a given game. Once myopic player actions are know,
Assumption 2 ensures that the efficient state is implemented if and only if all myopic players
choose A. The next section will simplify the payoff calculation even further by showing that
to know the payoff flow it is sufficient to know the first time when myopic player beliefs exceed
the threshold value.
5An incomplete regularized beta function is defined as Ic(a, b) =
∑a+b−1
k=a c
k(1 − c)a+b−1−k(a+b−1
k
)
. The
function is well defined because L
L+H−M ∈ (0, 1), from Assumption 1.
10
3.3 Undominated Action Plans of Sophisticated Players
This section shows that although sophisticated players could use action plans that prescribe
many switches from one action to the other, undominated action plans must prescribe at
most one switch from action B to action A and no switches from action A to action B. The
sophisticated player action space can therefore be restricted to a set of real numbers that
denote a switching time from A to B.
Definition 2. Denote by Us (for “undominated”) the set of action plan profiles in which no
sophisticated player is choosing strictly dominated action plans:
Us = {×s∈Sas ∈ As|@a′s : Π[a′s, a−s, ai(·, a′s × a−s)] > Π[as, a−s, ai(·, as × a−s)]}
An action profile will be called dominated if it is not in set Us, that is if in this action profile
at least one sophisticated player is choosing a dominated action plan.
We will show that the set of undominated action plans cannot contain any strategies that
prescribe a switch from A to B. The proof requires two additional lemmas.
Lemma 1. If two action plans of the sophisticated player prescribe the same action, the payoff
flow is higher for the action plan with which myopic player beliefs are higher:
pi[a′s(t), a−s(t)× ai(t, a′s × a−s)] ≥ pi[as(t), a−s(t)× ai(t, as × a−s)]
if x(t)′ ≥ x(t) and a′s(t) = as(t)
where x(t)′ is the belief held by myopic players if the sophisticated player uses action plan a′s
and x(t) is the belief if the sophisticated player uses action plan as.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
Lemma 1 shows that sophisticated players can only benefit from myopic players assigning
a higher probability to others choosing A. The proof is based on an observation that the
tendency for myopic players to choose A is increasing in their beliefs and sophisticated player
payoffs are increasing in the number of players who choose action A.
Definition 3. Denote by ABM the set of action plan profiles for sophisticated players with
which myopic players switch from A to B:
ABM = {×s∈Sas ∈ As|∃t1, t2 ∈ [0, T ] : t1 < t2
ai(t1,×s∈Sas) = 1
ai(t2,×s∈Sas) = 0}
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Lemma 2. All action plan profiles for sophisticated players with which myopic players switch
from A to B are strictly dominated:
ABM ∩ Us = ∅
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
The intuition of Lemma 2 is straightforward: if myopic players ever switch to an efficient
action A, the participation threshold will be exceeded as long as sophisticated players continue
choosing action A. Consequently, sophisticated players who would choose B would lower
their earnings. However, note that the proof rests on Assumption 2, which says that the
number of myopic players exceeds the participation threshold. If this assumption did not
hold, an argument about dominance could not be made because other sophisticated players
may prevent efficient coordination by switching to B, which would make switching to B
optimal.
Definition 4. Denote by ABS the set of action plan profiles for sophisticated players with
which at least one sophisticated player switches from A to B:
ABS = {×s∈Sas ∈ As|∃t1, t2 ∈ [0, T ], s ∈ S : t1 < t2
as(t1) = 1
as(t2) = 0}
Proposition 2. Action plan profiles for sophisticated players that prescribe a switch from A
to B for at least one sophisticated player are dominated:
ABS ∩ Us = ∅
Proof.
Take an action plan profile ×s∈Sas ∈ ABS . We will show that in this action profile at least
one sophisticated player must be choosing an action plan that is dominated.
If ×s∈Sas ∈ ABM , at least one sophisticated player must be choosing a dominated action
plan, from Lemma 2, and the proof would be completed. Alternatively, assume that ×s∈Sas ∈
{ABS \ABM}. By the definition of ABS , there must be a sophisticated player whose action
plan prescribes a switch from A to B; denote the action plan of this player by a˜s and denote the
switching time prescribed by a˜s by t
′. Then there must be some small  such that a˜s(t) = 1 if
t ∈ [t′− , t′) and a˜s(t) = 0 if t ∈ [t′, t′+ ]. Since ×s∈Sas 6∈ ABM , myopic players switch from
B to A at most once, thus their choices can be described by a number tˆ(a˜s) that identifies this
switching time: B is chosen in the interval [0, tˆ(a˜s)) and A is chosen in the interval [tˆ(a˜s), T ].
12
First, suppose that t′ ≥ tˆ(a˜s), then myopic players would be choosing A at any time t ≥ t′.
Assumption 2 implies that the threshold will be exceeded at any such point in time, therefore
an action plan a˜s is dominated by an action plan that prescribes A at each point in time
t ≥ tˆ(a˜s). Next, suppose that t′ < tˆ(a˜s) and tˆ(a˜s) > T . Then myopic players will choose B
for the entire period that is taken into account by the sophisticated player, thus action plan
a˜s will be dominated by an action plan that prescribes B at all times.
Alternatively, suppose that tˆ(a˜s) > t
′ and tˆ(a˜s) ≤ T (see an illustration in figure 2). Choose
 to be sufficiently small to satisfy tˆ(a˜s) > t
′+ . Then for any a˜s construct an action plan a′s
the following way:
a′s(t) =

a˜s(t) if t ∈ [0, t′ − ) ∪ (t′ + , T ]
0 if t ∈ [t′ − , t′]
1 if t ∈ (t′, t′ + ]
In other words, a′s is constructed by taking a˜s and swapping choices prescribed in the interval
(t′− , t′) with choices prescribed in the interval (t′, t′+ ). We will show that a˜s is dominated
by a′s.
The comparison of payoff flows generated by these two action plans is shown in figure 2. In
the interval [0, t+ ) the sum of payoff flows is the same for both action plans (pi1 + pi2 + pi3).
Payoffs are equal because with both action plans myopic players choose B in this entire interval
(both tˆ(a′s) and tˆ(a˜s) exceed t′ + ), therefore the participation threshold is never exceeded.
Action plan a˜s prescribes A for the same duration of time as a
′
s, therefore the sum of payoffs
in the interval [0, t′ + ) would be the same for both action plans.
t
0 t′ −  t′ t′ +  tˆ(a′s) tˆ(a˜s) T
pi(a˜s) = pi1 pi2 pi3 pi4 pi5 pi6
pi(a′s) = pi1 pi3 pi2 ≥ pi4 > pi5 ≥ pi6
Figure 2: Payoff flows generated by action plans a˜s and a
′
s for the case tˆ(a˜s) > t
′ and tˆ(a˜s) ≤ T .
In the interval [t′ + , T ] the sum of payoffs generated by a′s is strictly higher than that of a˜s.
Since a˜s(t) = a
′
s(t), ∀t ∈ (t′+ , T ], any payoff difference between the two action plans in this
interval must be due to the choices of myopic players. From equation 1, xi(t) would be the
same under a˜s(t) as under as(t)
′ if γ was equal to 1. But as γ ∈ (0, 1), older observations
receive less weight and therefore myopic player beliefs would be strictly higher following a′s
than following a˜s at any time t ∈ (t′ + , T ]. Then Lemma 1 implies that the payoff flow is
always weakly higher for a′s at any time in the interval [t′+, T ]. To get strict dominance, note
that tˆ(a′s) < tˆ(a˜s), for the following reasons. Since tˆ(a′s) ∈ (t′+, T ] and x(t) is continuous, the
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switching period tˆ(a′s) must satisfy x′i(tˆ(a
′
s)) = I
−1. But since x˜i(t) < x′i(t), ∀t ∈ (t′ + , T ],
it must also hold that x˜i(tˆ(a
′
s)) < x
′
i(tˆ(a
′
s)) = I
−1. Consequently, the intersection of beliefs
x˜i(t) and belief threshold I
−1 must occur strictly later, so that tˆ(a′s) < tˆ(a˜s). In the interval
(tˆ(a′s), tˆ(a˜s)) action plan a˜s provides a flow of payoffs of at most L, while a′s provides a payoff
of H because more than θ players are choosing A.
The comparison of payoff flows associated with action plans a˜s and a
′
s is shown in figure 2.
The sum of payoff flows generated by a′s will be strictly higher than the sum of payoff flows
generated by a˜s, therefore action plan a˜s that prescribes switching from A to B is strictly
dominated by another action plan a′s.

The intuition of the proof is as follows: suppose that a sophisticated player switches from
A to B. If myopic players switch from B to A at the same time or earlier, a sophisticated
player would do better by always playing A instead. If myopic players never switch to A,
there would be no incentive to play A in the first place. If myopic players switch at some time
after the sophisticated player, the sophisticated player can strictly increase the earnings by
teaching less at the start of the game and teaching more later.6 Doing so would not reduce
the payoffs prior to the switch, but would strictly decrease the switching time of the myopic
players, because weighted fictitious play puts more weight on recent experience. Consequently,
whenever sophisticated players are considering teaching for some period of time, they would
be better off concentrating all the teaching just before the predicted switch of myopic players,
thus a switch from A to B would never occur.
This section has shown that if sophisticated players do not choose dominated action plans,
both myopic and sophisticated players will switch from B to A at most once, thus in the
equilibrium the path of choices for either type can be described by a scalar indicating the
switching time.
Each action path of myopic players that can be induced by undominated action paths of
sophisticated players has the following structure:
ai(t,×as) =
{
0 if t ∈ [0, tˆ(×as))
1 if t ∈ [tˆ(×as), T ]
∀as ∈ Us
Define tˆ ∈ (0,∞) as the switching period of myopic players. Note that tˆ > 0 because
equation 1 implies that xi(0) = 0, thus B is chosen at time 0.
6By “teaching” we mean choosing action A to induce myopic players to choose A in the future.
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Each undominated action plan for sophisticated players has the following structure:
as(t) =
{
0 if t ∈ [0, ys)
1 if t ∈ [ys, T ]
∀as ∈ Us
Define ys ∈ [0, T ] as a strategy for player s.
In the next section we will specify how the switching period of myopic players depends on
the strategies of sophisticated players.
3.4 Optimal Switching Period for Myopic Players
The characterization of symmetric sophisticated player equilibria requires information about
payoffs in an equilibrium and payoffs from potential deviations: in the first case all (n−m)
sophisticated players choose the same strategy, in the second case (n−m− 1) sophisticated
players choose one strategy and one player chooses a different one. Denote the strategy of
one sophisticated player by ys = y and the strategy of other n−m− 1 sophisticated players
by yj = y¯, for all j ∈ {S \ s}. Sophisticated player payoffs are determined by the switching
period of myopic players, thus we first specify function tˆ(y, y¯) that shows how the myopic
player switching period depends on y and y¯.
There are three cases to consider. In the first case, tˆ(y, y¯) > max{y, y¯}, so that myopic players
observe no other players choosing A from time 0 to time min{y, y¯}, a fraction of n−mn−1 others
choosing A from time max{y, y¯} to tˆ(y, y¯) and either a fraction of 1n−1 others choosing A from
time y¯ to time y (if y > y¯) or a fraction of n−m−1n−1 others choosing A from time y to y¯ (if
y¯ > y). Feedback observed by myopic players in this case is illustrated in figure 3.
In the second case, y < tˆ(y, y¯) < y¯. This will be true only if 1n−1 > I
−1, that is if myopic
players would switch to A after observing only one player choosing A. In this case each myopic
player will observe no others choosing A from time 0 to y and a fraction of 1n−1 others choosing
A from time y to tˆ(y, y¯).
In the third case, y¯ < tˆ(y, y¯) < y. Then each myopic player will observe no others choosing
A from time 0 to y¯ and a fraction of n−m−1n−1 others choosing A from time y¯ to tˆ(y, y¯).
It is never possible that tˆ(y, y¯) < min{y, y¯} because at time t ∈ [0,min{y, y¯}) myopic players
observe no others choosing A and therefore always choose B.
Proposition 3. The switching period of myopic players is:
tˆ(y, y¯) =

tˆ2(y) if y < tˆ2(y) ≤ y¯ and 1n−1 > I−1
tˆ3(y¯) if y¯ < tˆ3(y¯) ≤ y and n−m−1n−1 > I−1
tˆ1(y, y¯) if max{y, y¯} < tˆ1(y, y¯) and n−mn−1 > I−1
∞ otherwise
(13)
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such that
tˆ1(y, y¯) =
log(n−mn−1 − I−1)− log(γ−y¯ n−m−1n−1 + γ−y 1n−1 − γT
′
I−1)
log(γ)
(14)
tˆ2(y) =
log( 1n−1 − I−1)− log(γ−y 1n−1 − γT
′
I−1)
log(γ)
(15)
tˆ3(y¯) =
log(n−m−1n−1 − I−1)− log(γ−y¯ n−m−1n−1 − γT
′
I−1)
log(γ)
(16)
where y is the strategy of one sophisticated player and y¯ is the strategy of other (n−m− 1)
sophisticated players.
It is never possible that more than one condition of 13 is satisfied because tˆ1(y, y¯) ≤ tˆ2(y)
and tˆ1(y, y¯) ≤ tˆ3(y) (see Lemma 10 in Appendix A).
Proof.
Case 1: tˆ(y, y¯) > max{y, y¯}
t
-T’ 0 y y¯ tˆ(y, y¯) T
B
B A
B A
B A
(m− 1) myopic players
1 sophisticated player
(n−m− 1)
sophisticated players
Figure 3: Illustration of the feedback observed by a single myopic player in the first case,
where tˆ(y, y¯) > max{y, y¯}. In this example y¯ > y. Vertical axis shows the fraction of other
players choosing A or B, horizontal axis shows the passage of time. The first sophisticated
player switches from B to A at time y, other (n−m− 1) sophisticated players switch at time
y¯ and myopic players switch at time tˆ(y, y¯)
Recall that beliefs of myopic players are calculated using weighted fictitious play from equation
1. If sophisticated players are using strategies y and y¯, myopic player beliefs at any time
t ∈ (max{y, y¯}, tˆ(y, y¯)] will be calculated using the following rule:
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xi(t) =
∫ t−y¯
k=0 γ
k(n−m−1n−1 )dk +
∫ t−y
k=0 γ
k( 1n−1)dk∫ t+T ′
k=0 γ
kdk
=
=
(γt−y¯ − 1)(n−m−1n−1 ) + (γt−y − 1)( 1n−1)
γt+T ′ − 1
Expressions in the numerator correspond to the history observed by a myopic player at time
t ∈ (max{y, y¯}, tˆ(y, y¯)]: (n−m−1) sophisticated players are observed choosing A for a period
of t− y¯ and one sophisticated player is observed choosing A for a period of t−y. This feedback
is illustrated in figure 3. The denominator measures the length of the entire history, including
the T ′ rounds of inefficient coordination.
From Proposition 1, myopic players will choose A at time t if xi(t) ≥ I−1:
ai(t) = 1 ⇔
(γt−y¯ − 1)(n−m−1n−1 ) + (γt−y − 1)( 1n−1)
γt+T ′ − 1 ≥ I
−1 ⇔
γt+T
′
(γ−y¯−T
′ n−m− 1
n− 1 + γ
−y−T ′ 1
n− 1 − I
−1) ≤ n−m
n− 1 − I
−1 (17)
If n−mn−1 − I−1 ≤ 0, equation (17) is never satisfied because of the following relationship that
contradicts (17):
γt+T
′
(γ−y¯−T ′ n−m−1n−1 + γ
−y−T ′ 1
n−1 − I−1) > γt+T
′
(n−mn−1 − I−1) ≥ n−mn−1 − I−1
(18)
The first inequality holds because γ−y¯−T ′ > 1 and γ−y−T ′ > 1 and the second inequality holds
because γt+T
′
< 1 and n−mn−1 − I−1 ≤ 0. But (18) contradicts (17), therefore if n−mn−1 − I−1 ≤ 0,
equation (17) is never satisfied and myopic players would choose B at any time t.
Alternatively, if n−mn−1 − I−1 > 0, condition (17) can be expressed the following way:
γ−t ≥ γ
−y¯ n−m−1
n−1 + γ
−y 1
n−1 − γT
′
I−1
n−m
n−1 − I−1
(19)
The left-hand side of (19) is strictly increasing in t and unbounded for any γ ∈ (0, 1), so (19)
will be satisfied for some t, although not necessarily with t ≤ T . Equation (19) is not satisfied
for t = 0 because the RHS of (19) is always strictly larger than 1 (RHS is increasing in both
y and y¯, but RHS > 1 even if y = y¯ = 0 because n−mn−1 − γT
′
I−1 > n−mn−1 − I−1) and γ−t < 1.
Consequently, (19) must be satisfied with equality at a unique value of t, which we denote by
tˆ1(y, y¯), with tˆ1(y, y¯) ∈ (0,∞). This value is the first moment in time at which myopic players
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are indifferent between choosing A and B, thus it is exactly the switching period which we
were looking for. To get an expression for tˆ1(y, y¯), require (19) to be satisfied with equality
and rearrange the following way:
tˆ1(y, y¯) =
log(n−mn−1 − I−1)− log(γ−y¯ n−m−1n−1 + γ−y 1n−1 − γT
′
I−1)
log(γ)
(20)
Of course, tˆ(y, y¯) can be calculated using (20) only if n−mn−1 − I−1 > 0, otherwise myopic
players would always play B. The precise characterization of the switching period if case 1 is
applicable is as follows:
tˆ(y, y¯) =
{
tˆ1(y, y¯) if
n−m
n−1 − I−1 > 0
∞ otherwise (21)
Note that it is not required that tˆ1(y, y¯) ≤ T , therefore it is possible that the planning horizon
of a sophisticated player is too short to take re-coordination into account.
Case 2: y < tˆ < y¯
Case 3: y¯ < tˆ < y
Proofs for Case 2 and Case 3 are in Appendix A.1.

Lemma 3. ∂tˆ2(y)∂y > 1.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
Lemma 3 implies that if tˆ2(0) < T , it would be optimal for all sophisticated players to choose
y = 0: increasing y by an amount of ε would increase the payoffs by εL, because of a longer
delay, but would simultaneously decrease the payoffs by more than εH because of the longer
switching period of myopic players.
3.5 Payoffs of Sophisticated Players
Proposition 3 shows how tˆ(y, y¯), the switching period of myopic players, depends on sophis-
ticated player strategies, if one player is using strategy y and all other players are using
strategies y¯. Proposition 4 will show how this specification can be used to calculate the sum
of payoffs received by sophisticated players over the period that is taken into consideration.
Proposition 4. If a sophisticated player s uses strategy ys = y and other sophisticated players
use strategies y−s = y¯, total payoff received by player s over period [0, T ] is Π(y, y¯) such that:
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Π(y, y¯) =

Π1 = yL+ (T − tˆ1(y, y¯))H if tˆ1(y, y¯) ≤ T , tˆ2(y) ≥ y¯, tˆ3(y¯) ≥ y (22a)
Π2 = yL+ (T − tˆ2(y))H if tˆ2(y) < y¯ (22b)
Π3 = yL+ (T − y)H if tˆ3(y¯) < y (22c)
Π4 = yL if tˆ1(y, y¯) > T (22d)
where tˆ1(y, y¯), tˆ2(y) and tˆ3(y¯) are specified in Proposition 3.
Proof.
The payoff function depends on the switching period of myopic players, which is determined
by one of the four equations in condition (13). Each possibility is shown in figure 4. Consider
panel (a), which illustrates a situation where all sophisticated players switch to A first7,
and myopic players follow later, therefore their switching time is calculated as tˆ1(y, y¯). The
participation threshold is not exceeded at any time prior to tˆ1(y, y¯) and is exceeded afterwards,
therefore the payoff flow of a sophisticated player is L prior to time y, 0 between time y and
tˆ1(y, y¯) and H afterwards. The sum of payoffs in this case would be equal to Π1(y, y¯) =
yL + (T − tˆ1(y, y¯))H. Panel (a), however, applies only if myopic players switch after all
sophisticated ones, that is if tˆ2(y) ≥ y¯ and tˆ3(y¯) ≥ y, and if switching occurs prior to time T.
t
Panel (a): tˆ(y, y¯) = tˆ1(y, y¯)
t
Panel (c): tˆ(y, y¯) = tˆ3(y¯)
t
Panel (b): tˆ(y, y¯) = tˆ2(y)
t
Panel (d): tˆ(y, y¯) > T
y y¯ tˆ1(y, y¯) T y¯ tˆ3(y¯) y T
y tˆ2(y) y¯ T y¯ y T tˆ3(y, y¯)
L 0 H L H
L 0 H L 0
Figure 4: Stage game payoffs for every possible case. Panel numbering corresponds to equa-
tions in (22).
Another possibility is that myopic players switch after observing only one sophisticated player
switching to A, a case illustrated in panel (b). Then the sophisticated player will receive a
payoff flow equal to L at any time prior to y, a flow of 0 between time y and tˆ2(y) and a
flow of H between tˆ2(y) and T. The sum of payoffs in this case would be equal to Π2(y, y¯) =
yL+ (T − tˆ2(y))H. Panel (b) applies only if tˆ2(y) < y¯.
In a similar way, (n−m−1) sophisticated players may switch first, followed by myopic players
7Panel (a) illustrates the situation with y < y¯, but the payoff calculation for y ≥ y¯ would be equivalent.
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and then by a single sophisticated player, illustrated in panel (c). Sophisticated player would
receive L until time y, and would receive H afterwards. The sum of payoffs would therefore
be equal to Π3(y, y¯) = yL+ (T − y)H. Panel (c) applies only if tˆ3(y¯) < y.
Finally, myopic players may never switch to A, as illustrated in panel (d). In this case the
sophisticated player would receive L until time y, and 0 afterwards, thus the total payoff
would be Π4(y, y¯) = yL.

3.6 Characterisation of Symmetric Sophisticated Player Equilibria
Payoffs for each strategy of player s and the strategies of other sophisticated players are
specified in (22). This specification transforms a repeated game into a static game played by
sophisticated players, who are able to perfectly anticipate the choice path of myopic players.
To make theoretical predictions, we can use the standard solution concept for static games –
a Nash equilibrium – which requires mutual best responses for each player.
Proposition 2 shows that undominated action plans for sophisticated players can be identified
by a strategy that identifies a switching time. We will therefore use the definition from (5)
to call a combination of strategies (y∗, y∗) a symmetric sophisticated player equilibrium if it
satisfies:
Π(y∗, y¯∗) ≥ Π(y, y¯∗), ∀y ∈ [0, T ] (23)
and y∗ = y¯∗
We will look at the existence of three types of equilibria: interior solutions with y = y¯ ∈ (0, T ),
a corner solution with y = y¯ = 0 and a corner solution with y = y¯ = T . For each type we
will determine the conditions under which an equilibrium exists, and the speed of transition
to an efficient state.
3.6.1 Interior Sophisticated Player Equilibria
In this section we will derive the existence conditions for an interior equilibrium and show
how the speed of transition to the efficient equilibrium depends on the game parameters.
Proposition 5. A combination of strategies (y∗, y∗) with y∗ ∈ (0, T ) is a sophisticated player
equilibrium (“interior equilibrium”) if and only if conditions I1, I2, I3 and I4 are satisfied:
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tˆ1(y
∗, y∗) < T , (I1)
log(n−m−H/L
I−1(n−1) )
log(γ)
− T ′ > 0, (I2)
tˆ1(y
∗, y∗)− y∗L/H ≤ tˆ2(0), (I3)
tˆ1(y
∗, y∗)− y∗L/H ≤ T (1− L/H), (I4)
where equilibrium strategies are calculated by
y∗ =
log(n−m−H/L
I−1(n−1) )
log(γ)
− T ′
Proof.
The structure of the proof is shown in figure 5. First we need to specify the equilibrium
payoffs. If condition I1 holds, condition (22a) will hold as well, from Lemma 10, therefore
Π(y∗, y∗) = Π1(y∗, y∗). If I1 does not hold, Π(y∗, y∗) = Π4(y∗, y∗) = y∗L, and an interior
equilibrium will not exist because there is a profitable deviation to a strategy y = T that
provides a payoff of TL. Condition I1 is therefore the first necessary condition for the existence
of an interior equilibrium, and we will show that it is also jointly sufficient, together with
conditions I2, I3 and I4. These proofs are given in additional lemmas. Lemma 4 shows
that equilibrium payoffs exceed deviation payoffs if and only if equilibrium payoffs exceed
the payoffs of two endpoints, 0 and T , and the payoffs of ‘neighboring’ strategies, calculated
by Π1(y, y
∗). Lemma 5, 6 and 7 derive the conditions under which there are no profitable
deviations for each case.
Π(y∗, y∗) ≥ Π(y, y∗), ∀y ∈ [0, T ] Π4(y∗, y∗) ≥ Π4(y, y∗), ∀y ∈ [0, T ]
Π1(y
∗, y∗) ≥ Π(y, y∗),∀y ∈ [0, T ]

Π1(y
∗, y∗) ≥ Π1(y, y∗),∀y ∈ (y′′, y′)
Π1(y
∗, y∗) ≥ Π2(0, y∗)
Π1(y
∗, y∗) ≥ Π4(T, y∗)
I2
I3
I4
if not I1
if I1
Lemma 4
Lemma 5
Lemma 6
Lemma 7
Figure 5: Structure of the proof for Proposition 5.
Lemma 4.
Π1(y
∗, y∗) ≥ Π(y, y∗),∀y ∈ [0, T ] ⇔

Π1(y
∗, y∗) ≥ Π2(0, y∗)
Π1(y
∗, y∗) ≥ Π1(y, y∗),∀y ∈ [y′′, y′]
Π1(y
∗, y∗) ≥ Π4(T, y∗)
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If tˆ3(y
∗) ≤ T , y′ = tˆ3(y∗), otherwise y′ solves tˆ1(y′, y∗) = T . If tˆ2(0) > y∗, y′′ = 0, otherwise
y′′ solves tˆ2(y′′) = y∗.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
Lemma 5. Π1(y
∗, y∗) ≥ Π1(y, y∗), ∀y ∈ (y′′, y′), if and only if condition I2 is satisfied:
log(n−m−H/L
I−1(n−1) )
log(γ)
− T ′ > 0, (I2)
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
Lemma 5 specifies conditions under which there are no profitable deviations to strategies in
the interval [y′′, y′]. In addition, equilibrium payoffs must be higher than the payoffs from
choosing y = 0 and y = T . Conditions under which there are no incentives to deviate to such
strategies are specified in Lemma 6 and Lemma 7.
Lemma 6. Π1(y
∗, y∗) ≥ Π2(0, y∗) if and only if condition I3 is satisfied:
tˆ1(y
∗, y∗)− y∗L/H ≤ tˆ2(0), (I3)
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
Lemma 7. Π1(y
∗, y∗) ≥ Π4(T, y∗) if and only if condition I4 is satisfied:
tˆ1(y
∗, y∗)− y∗L/H ≤ T (1− L/H), (I4)
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
Taken together, Lemmas 5, 6 and 7 prove Proposition 5. Conditions I1, I2, I3 and I4 are
jointly sufficient because if all of them are satisfied there are no incentives to deviate to any
strategy in [0, T ]. If one of these conditions is violated, there will be a strategy in some region
that exceeds the equilibrium payoff.

3.6.2 Corner Solution y∗ = 0
In a second type of a symmetric sophisticated player equilibrium all sophisticated players
switch to A at the start of the game, so that equilibrium strategies are y∗ = y∗ = 0.
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Proposition 6. A combination of strategies (0, 0) is a sophisticated player equilibrium (“teach-
ing equilibrium”) if and only if conditions T1 and T2 are satisfied:
n−m−H/L
n− 1 ≤ γ
T ′I−1, (T1)
tˆ1(0, 0) ≤ T (1− L/H), (T2)
Proof.
Π(0, 0) ≥ Π(y, 0), ∀y ∈ [0, T ] Π4(0, y∗) ≥ Π(y, y∗),∀y ∈ [0, T ]
Π1(0, 0) ≥ Π(y, 0), ∀y ∈ [0, T ]
{
Π1(0, 0) ≥ Π1(y, 0), ∀y ∈ [0, y′)
Π1(0, 0) ≥ Π4(T, 0)
T1
T2
if tˆ1(0,0)>T
if tˆ1(0,0)≤T
Lemma 8
Lemma 9
Figure 6: Structure of the proof for Proposition 6.
Structure of the proof is shown in figure 6 and is similar to the proof of the interior equilibrium.
The teaching equilibrium exists if (23) is satisfied for y∗ = 0:
Π(0, 0) ≥ Π(y, 0), ∀y ∈ [0, T ]
If tˆ1(0, 0) > T , condition (22d) is satisfied and equilibrium payoffs are determined by Π(0, 0) =
Π4(0, 0) = 0, while deviation payoffs are determined by Π(y, 0) = yL. Then a teaching
equilibrium would not exist because there is a profitable deviation to strategy y = T that
provides a payoff of TL. If tˆ1(0, 0) ≤ T , equilibrium payoffs are calculated by Π1(0, 0).
Condition tˆ1(0, 0) ≤ T is therefore necessary for the existence of an interior equilibrium. We
do not list this condition separately because it is implied by T2.
Deviation payoffs are determined in a similar way to the deviation payoffs for an interior
equilibrium. Payoffs for a small y ∈ [0, t′] are calculated by Π1(y, 0), where y′ solves tˆ1(y′, 0) =
T . If the deviation is larger, that is y ∈ [t′, T ], myopic player would never switch to A and
deviation profits would be calculated by Π4(y, 0) = yL. All strategies in this interval would be
dominated by strategy y = T that provides a payoff of TL. Overall, there are two requirements
that need to be satisfied for a teaching equilibrium to exist. First, equilibrium payoffs should
be higher than the payoffs from any other y ∈ [0, y′), calculated by Π1(y, 0). We will derive
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the conditions under which this requirement is satisfied in Lemma 8. Second, equilibrium
payoffs should be higher than the payoff of strategy y = T ; we will derive the conditions for
this requirement in Lemma 9.
Lemma 8. Π1(0, 0) ≥ Π1(y, 0), ∀y ∈ [0, y′) if and only if condition T1 is satisfied:
n−m−H/L
n− 1 ≤ γ
T ′I−1 (T1)
where y′ solves tˆ1(y′, 0) = T .
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
Lemma 9. Π1(0, 0) ≥ Π4(T, 0) if and only if condition T2 is satisfied:
tˆ1(0, 0) ≤ T (1− L/H) (T2)
Proof.
Deviation payoffs are calculated from (22d): Π4(T, 0) = TL. There are no incentives to
deviate if
Π1(0, 0) ≥ Π4(T, 0) ⇔ tˆ1(0, 0) ≤ T (1− L/H)

If both T1 and T2 hold, equilibrium payoffs are calculated by Π1(0, 0) and there are no
incentives to deviate neither to neighbouring strategies nor to strategy y = T . If one of these
conditions is violated, there would be profitable deviation and a teaching equilibrium would
not exist.

3.6.3 Corner Solution y∗ = T
In the third type of a symmetric sophisticated player equilibrium all sophisticated players
choose B for the entire duration of the game, that is y∗ = y¯∗ = T .
Proposition 7. A combination of strategies (T, T ) is a sophisticated player equilibrium (“de-
lay equilibrium”) if and only if condition D1 is satisfied:
tˆ2(0) ≥ T (1− L/H) (D1)
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Π(T, T ) ≥ Π(y, T ), ∀y ∈ [0, T ]
Π4(T, T ) ≥ Π(y, T ), ∀y ∈ [0, T ]
{
Π4(T, T ) ≥ Π2(0, T )
Π4(T, T ) ≥ Π4(y, T ), ∀y ∈ [y′, T ]
D1
Always satisfied
Figure 7: Structure of the proof for Proposition 7.
Proof.
If there is a symmetric equilibrium with y∗ = T , it must hold that:
Π(T, T ) ≥ Π(y, T ), ∀y ∈ [0, T ]
The structure of the proof is shown in figure 7. Condition (22d) is satisfied, therefore equilib-
rium payoffs are Π(T, T ) = Π4(T, T ) = TL. Deviation payoffs Π(y, T ) are calculated either
as Π4(y, T ) if y ∈ [y′, T ] or as Π2(y, T ) if y ∈ [0, y′), where y′ solves tˆ2(y′) = T . In the former
case Π4(y, T ) = yL, which is less that the payoff of TL provided by strategy y = T , therefore
the delay equilibrium would exist. In the latter case deviation payoffs are equal to:
Π(y, T ) = Π2(y, T ) = yL+ (T − tˆ2(y))H
Lemma 3 implies that argmaxy(Π2(y, T )) = 0, that is the most profitable deviation is to
strategy y = 0. There will be no incentives to deviate to this strategy if the following holds:
Π4(T, T ) ≥ Π2(y, T ) ⇔
TL ≥ (T − tˆ2(0))H ⇔
tˆ2(0) ≥ T (1− L/H)
If this condition is satisfied, there will be no incentives to deviate to y = 0 and there would
be no other profitable deviations, therefore a delay equilibrium would exist. If this condition
is not satisfied, payoffs could be increased by choosing strategy y = 0.

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Table 1: Summary of the types of symmetric Nash equilibria that may exist, speed of transition to the efficient state and the conditions
that need to be satisfied for the particular type of equilibrium to exist.
Equilibrium Teaching Interior Delay
Equilibrium strategy y∗ = 0 y∗ =
log(
n−m−H/L
I−1(n−1) )
log(γ) − T ′ y∗ = T
Speed of transition tˆ(y∗, y∗) = tˆ1(0, 0) tˆ(y∗, y∗) = tˆ1(y∗, y∗) tˆ(y∗, y∗) > T
Equilibrium payoffs Π(0, 0) = (T − tˆ1(0, 0))H Π(y∗, y∗) = y∗L + (T −
tˆ1(y
∗, y∗))H
Π(T, T ) = TL
Existence conditions
No deviation to neigh-
bouring strategies
T1: n−m−H/Ln−1 ≤ γT
′
I−1 I2: y∗ > 0 –
No deviation to y = 0 – I3: tˆ1(y
∗, y∗)−y∗L/H ≤ tˆ2(0) D1: T (1 − L/H) ≤
tˆ2(0)
No deviation to y = T T2: tˆ1(0, 0) ≤ T (1− L/H) I1: tˆ1(y∗, y∗) < T
I4: tˆ1(y
∗, y∗) − y∗L/H ≤
T (1− L/H)
–
4 Summary and Comparative Statics
Overall, three types of symmetric Nash equilibria can exist: in a “teaching” equilibrium all
sophisticated players play A for the entire duration of the game and myopic players switch
to A at some time tˆ1(0, 0); in a “delay” equilibrium all sophisticated players choose B for the
entire duration of the game, and myopic players never switch to A; in an interior equilibrium
sophisticated players start by playing B and switch to A at time y∗ while myopic players
switch to A at time tˆ1(y
∗, y∗). Table 1 summarizes all the conditions that need to be satisfied
for each type of equilibrium to exist. Depending on the combination of parameters, it is
possible that multiple equilibria will exist at the same time or that no symmetric equilibrium
will exist.
We would like to make theoretical predictions about how the path of play depends on the
game parameters, but precise predictions cannot be made due to the multiplicity of equilibria.
Therefore we separately investigate how the factors of interest affect the existence conditions
of each type of equilibria and the speed of transition to an efficient state. The factors that
we consider are the length of planning horizon of sophisticated players (T ), the number of
myopic players (m) and the strength of initial lock-in (T ′).
4.1 Planning Horizon of the Sophisticated Players
The first parameter of interest is T , the length of the planning horizon for sophisticated
players.
Proposition 8. If sophisticated players have a longer planning horizon, then:
1. The speed of transition in any equilibrium is not affected.
2. Teaching equilibrium exists for a larger set of values of other parameters.
3. Interior equilibrium exists for a larger set of values of other parameters.
4. Delay equilibrium exists for a smaller set of values of other parameters.
Proof.
Part 1 follows from the definition of the switching period, which depends only on myopic
players who do not take future payoffs into account. For part 2, note that only condition T2
depends on the planing horizon, and T2 is satisfied for a larger set of parameters when T
is higher. For part 3, note that conditions I2 and I4 depend on the length of the planning
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horizon, and both are satisfied for a larger set of parameters when T is larger. Part 4 holds
because condition D1 is satisfied for a smaller set of parameters when T is larger.

4.2 Player Composition
The second variable of interest is m, the number of myopic players, which reflects a different
aspect of sophistication than the length of the planning horizon. Instead of making sophisti-
cated players more sophisticated, we look at the effect of replacing some myopic players with
sophisticated ones, while keeping the total number of players constant.
Proposition 9. If there are more sophisticated players, then:
1. Transition is faster in the interior and in the teaching equilibria.
2. The effect on the existence of a teaching equilibrium or an interior equilibrium is am-
biguous:
(a) there are more incentives to deviate to neighboring action plans
(b) there are less incentives to never choose A.
3. There is no change in the existence of the delay equilibrium.
Proof.
This proof as well as other proofs on comparative statics rely on additional lemmas presented
in Appendix A.3. For part 1, see Lemmas 11 and 12. To see part 2 for the teaching equilibrium,
note that both condition T1 and condition T3 depend on player composition. A smaller
number of myopic players leads to T1 being satisfied for a smaller set of values of other
parameters. On the other hand, a smaller number of myopic players makes condition T2
satisfied for a larger set of parameters because tˆ1(0, 0) is increasing in m (see Lemma 11). For
the interior equilibrium, all four conditions depend on the number of sophisticated players.
Incentives to deviate to neighbouring strategies are determined by condition I2, which is
satisfied for a smaller set of parameters when there are more sophisticated players. To see
it, notice that ∂y
∗
∂m > 0 (Lemma 12), therefore as m decreases so does y
∗, therefore I2 is less
likely to be satisfied. Incentives to deviate to corner solutions are determined by conditions
I1, I3 and I4, all of which are satisfied for a larger set of parameters when there are more
sophisticated players. Conditions I3 and I4 are satisfied for a larger set of parameters because
∂tˆ1(y∗,y∗)
∂m >
∂y∗
∂m >
∂y∗
∂mL/H (see Lemma 14). Condition I1 is also satisfied for a larger set of
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parameters because ∂tˆ1(y
∗,y∗)
∂m > 0, from Lemma 12. Part 3 holds because outcomes in the
delay equilibrium are not affected by the number of myopic players.

The finding that an increase in the number of sophisticated players can reduce the incentives to
use strategic teaching may sound counterintuitive, but it is a result of decreased delay costs as
the number of teaching players grows. When the number of sophisticated players is large and
all of them are choosing A in the teaching equilibrium, the decision of a single sophisticated
player to delay teaching has only a small negative effect on the transition period, making free-
riding an attractive alternative that could lead to a break-down of a teaching equilibrium.
But if a teaching equilibrium does exist, a larger number of sophisticated players would make
transition faster.
4.3 Length of the History of Inefficient Coordination
The third factor that we look at is the strength of the initial lock-in to an inefficient state,
measured by the length of history of inefficient coordination, T ′.
Proposition 10. If the history of inefficient coordination is longer, then:
1. Transition is slower in the teaching equilibrium but faster in an interior equilibrium.
2. Teaching equilibrium exists for a smaller set of parameter values
3. The effect on the existence of an interior equilibrium is ambiguous
4. Delay equilibrium exists for a smaller set of parameter values.
Proof.
Part 1 holds because the derivative of tˆ1(0, 0) with respect to T
′ is positive while the derivative
of tˆ1(y
∗, y∗) is negative, as shown in Lemma 11 and Lemma 12. For part 2, parameter T ′
affects conditions T1 and T2. An increase in T ′ leads to T1 being satisfied for a smaller set
of parameter values, because γT
′
goes down. Condition T2 is also less likely to be satisfied
because of an increase in tˆ1(0, 0). For part 3, notice that an increase in T
′ satisfies conditions
I1, I3 and I4 for a larger set of parameter values, but satisfies condition I2 for a smaller set
of parameter values. Condition I1 is satisfied for a larger set of parameter values because
∂tˆ1(y∗,y∗)
∂T ′ < 0. Conditions I3 and I4 are also satisfied for a larger set of parameter values
because ∂tˆ1(y
∗,y∗)
∂T ′ =
∂y∗
∂T ′ <
∂y∗
∂T ′L/H and
tˆ2(0)
∂T ′ > 0, from Lemma 11, 12 and 13. Condition I2
is satisfied for a smaller set of parameters because ∂y
∗
∂T ′ < 0, from Lemma 14.
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Part 1 of Proposition 10 states that the history of inefficient coordination affects the transition
speed in opposite ways in the teaching and in the interior equilibrium. The opposite sign of
this effect is a result of changes of the equilibrium strategy in the interior equilibrium. If the
equilibrium strategy in an interior equilibrium was held constant, a longer history of inefficient
coordination would lead to a slower transition. However, to offset an increased history of
inefficient coordination, in an equilibrium sophisticated players have to start teaching earlier.
Lemma 12 shows that the latter effect is even stronger than the former.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we present a model that combines the notion of strategic and farsighted players,
favored by game-theoretic solution concepts, with a notion of adaptive players, favored by
learning models. We assume two types of players: myopic players make choices based on
observed history of play while sophisticated players have correct beliefs about the actions of
all other players, plan ahead and choose actions that maximize the sum of payoff flows. To
make predictions in this modified game we propose a new solution concept based on a Nash
equilibrium between sophisticated players who take the learning process of the myopic players
into account.
This solution concept is applied to a critical mass coordination game in which play has
converged to an inefficient state. The construction of a sophisticated player equilibrium
involves several steps. Proposition 1 shows that myopic players will choose the efficient action
if their beliefs exceed a certain threshold. Furthermore, in the sophisticated player equilibrium
myopic players will switch from an inefficient to the efficient action at most once. The single
switch and the assumption that there are sufficiently many myopic players means that the
efficient state is absorbing, therefore the switching time is the only information needed for
sophisticated players to calculate their payoffs. Proposition 3 shows exactly how the switching
time of myopic players can be calculated if beliefs were formed using weighted fictitious play.
The switching time depends on the strategies taken by sophisticated players, which could
prescribe many switches from one action to the other. The task of finding the switching time
of the myopic players is therefore greatly simplified by Proposition 2, which shows that only
the sophisticated player strategies prescribing at most one switch from the inefficient to the
efficient action survive the elimination of strictly dominated strategies, allowing a strategy to
be identified by the switching time.
The ability to anticipate the speed of a transition allows sophisticated players to calculate
how their payoffs depend on their own strategies and on the strategies chosen by other sophis-
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ticated players. The mapping from strategies to payoffs specified in Proposition 4 is used to
identify strategy profiles in which all sophisticated players are best responding to each other.
Three types of symmetric equilibria are possible: sophisticated players may play the efficient
action right away, they may switch to the efficient action later or they may never switch. In
the first two cases myopic players eventually start playing the efficient action, while in the
third case all players choose the inefficient action. Which types of equilibria exist and how
long the transition to an efficient state takes depends on the game parameters, as specified
in Propositions 5, 6 and 7. Finally, Propositions 8, 9 and 10 show how these existence con-
ditions depend on the history of inefficient coordination, length of the planning horizon of
sophisticated players and the player composition. As the planing horizon of sophisticated
players increases, teaching and interior equilibria exist for a larger set of parameters, while
the delay equilibrium exists for a smaller set of parameters. A larger number of sophisticated
players leads to faster transition to the efficient state in an interior or in a delay equilibrium,
but the effect on the existence conditions is ambiguous: there are more incentives to deviate
to neighboring strategies, but less incentives to deviate to corner solutions. Finally, we show
that a longer history of observed inefficient coordination leads to a slower transition in a
teaching equilibrium and to a smaller set of parameters under which a teaching equilibrium
exists, while the set of parameters under which the delay equilibrium exists is larger. On the
other hand, the transition to an efficient state in an interior equilibrium is faster, because a
longer history of inefficient coordination forces sophisticated players to start teaching earlier.
The problem that motivated this paper was the lack of a suitable theoretical model that
could be used to make predictions in a game in which inefficient conventions have already
been established. A small change in the assumptions – instead of assuming all players to be
farsighted we assume that some players are learning from history – leads to large differences in
theoretical predictions. Not only can the new model be used to model inefficient conventions
through the beliefs of myopic players, but it also reduces the set of predictions to only three
types of equilibria, in contrast to almost limitless predictions made by standard solution
concepts.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Case 2 and Case 3 of Proposition 3
Case 2: y < tˆ < y¯
t
-T’ 0 y y¯tˆ(y, y¯) T
B
B A
B A
B A
(m− 1) myopic players
1 sophisticated player
(n−m− 1)
sophisticated players
Figure 8: Illustration of the second case, where y < tˆ(y, y¯) ≤ y¯. The height of the figure shows
the fraction of players choosing action A or action B, the width shows the passage of time.
The first sophisticated player switches from B to A in period y, other (n-m-1) sophisticated
players switch in period y¯ and the myopic players switch in period tˆ.
The second possibility is that tˆ(y, y¯) ≤ y¯, that is myopic players switch to A earlier than
(n −m − 1) sophisticated players. In this case the actual value of y¯ will have no influence
on the switching period of myopic players, as they will never observe any of the (n−m− 1)
sophisticated players choosing A. Therefore the switching period will be a function only of
the strategy chosen by a single sophisticated player. At time t ∈ (y, tˆ] beliefs of a myopic
player i are xi(t):
xi(t) =
∫ t−y
k=0 γ
k( 1n−1)dk∫ t+T ′
k=0 γ
kdk
=
=
(γt−y − 1)( 1n−1)
γt+T ′ − 1
Player i will choose A in t if:
xi(t) ≥ I−1 ⇔
γt+T
′
(γ−y−T
′ 1
n− 1 − I
−1) ≤ 1
n− 1 − I
−1 (24)
If 1n−1−I−1 ≤ 0, equation (24) is never satisfied. To see this, notice the following relationship
that contradicts (24):
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γt+T
′
(γ−y−T
′ 1
n− 1 − I
−1) > γt+T
′
(
1
n− 1 − I
−1) ≥ 1
n− 1 − I
−1
The latter equation holds because γ−y−T ′ > 1, γt+T ′ < 1 and 1n−1 − I−1 ≤ 0.
Alternatively, if 1n−1 − I−1 > 0, (24) will be satisfied with equality at time tˆ2(y) ∈ (0,∞) that
satisfies:
γ−tˆ2(y) =
γ−y 1n−1 − γT
′
I−1
1
n−1 − I−1
⇔
tˆ2(y) =
log( 1n−1 − I−1)− log(γ−y 1n−1 − γT
′
I−1)
log(γ)
(25)
tˆ(y, y¯) can be calculated using (25) only if 1n−1 − I−1 > 0, otherwise myopic players would
never switch from A to B. The switching period if case 2 applies can be expressed as follows:
tˆ(y, y¯) =
{
tˆ2(y) if
1
n−1 − I−1 > 0
∞ otherwise (26)
Case 3: y¯ < tˆ < y
t
-T’ 0 yy¯ tˆ(y, y¯) T
B
B A
B A
B A
(m− 1) myopic players
1 sophisticated player
(n−m− 1)
sophisticated players
Figure 9: Illustration of the third case, where y¯ < tˆ(y, y¯) ≤ y. Height of the figure shows a
fraction of players choosing action A or action B, the width shows the passage of time. The
first sophisticated player switches from B to A in period y, other (n −m − 1) sophisticated
players switch in period y¯ and myopic players switch at time tˆ(y, y¯).
The third possibility is that y¯ < tˆ(y, y¯) ≤ y, that is at first (n−m− 1) sophisticated players
switch to A, then m myopic players switch and the last sophisticated player may switch some
time after the myopic ones. In this case the switching time is a function only of y¯. At time
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t ∈ (y¯, tˆ(y, y¯)] beliefs of a myopic player i are xi(t):
xi(t) =
∫ t−y¯
k=0 γ
k(n−m−1n−1 )dk∫ t+T ′
k=0 γ
kdk
=
=
(γt−y¯ − 1)(n−m−1n−1 )
γt+T ′ − 1
Player i will choose A in t if:
xi(t) ≥ I−1 ⇔
γt+T
′
(γ−y¯−T
′ n−m− 1
n− 1 − I
−1) ≤ n−m− 1
n− 1 − I
−1 (27)
If n−m−1n−1 − I−1 ≤ 0, condition (27) is never satisfied. To see this, notice the following
relationship that contradicts (27):
γt+T
′
(γ−y¯−T
′ n−m− 1
n− 1 − I
−1) > γt+T
′
(
n−m− 1
n− 1 − I
−1) ≥ n−m− 1
n− 1 − I
−1
The latter conditions holds because γ−y¯−T ′ > 1, γt+T ′ < 1 and n−m−1n−1 − I−1 ≤ 0. Therefore
if n−m−1n−1 − I−1 ≤ 0, equation (27) is never satisfied and myopic players would choose B at
any time t.
Alternatively, if n−m−1n−1 − I−1 > 0, (27) will be satisfied with equality at time tˆ3(y) ∈ (0,∞)
that satisfies:
γ−tˆ3(y¯) =
γ−y¯ n−m−1n−1 − γT
′
I−1
n−m−1
n−1 − I−1
⇔ (28)
tˆ3(y¯) =
log(n−m−1n−1 − I−1)− log(γ−y¯ n−m−1n−1 − γT
′
I−1)
log(γ)
(29)
tˆ(y, y¯) can be calculated using (29) only if n−m−1n−1 − I−1 > 0. Therefore, the switching period
if case 3 applies can be expressed as follows:
tˆ(y, y¯) =
{
tˆ3(y¯) if
n−m−1
n−1 − I−1 > 0
∞ otherwise (30)
A.2 Proof of Lemmas
Lemma 1: If two action plans of the sophisticated player prescribe the same action, the
payoff flow is higher for the action plan with which myopic player beliefs are higher:
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pi[a′s(t), a−s(t)× ai(t, a′s × a−s)] ≥ pi[as(t), a−s(t)× ai(t, as × a−s)]
if x(t)′ ≥ x(t) and a′s(t) = as(t)
where x(t)′ is the belief held by myopic players if sophisticated player uses action plan a′s and
x(t) is the belief if sophisticated player uses action plan as.
Proof:
Consider two action plans as and a
′
s that prescribe the same action at time t, but prescribe
different actions prior to time t so that myopic players would hold higher beliefs following the
history generated by a′s.
From equation (7), ai(t, as × a−s) is weakly increasing in beliefs xi(t), therefore:
ai(t, a
′
s × a−s) ≥ ai(t, as × a−s)
Since we hold the action plans of other strategic players constant, a higher tendency to
choose A by myopic players increases the total number of other players who choose A at time
t. Because H > 0 and M ≥ 0, equation (6) implies that payoffs are weakly increasing in the
number of other players choosing A, therefore the payoff generated by a′s must be at least as
high as the payoff generated by as:
pi[a′s(t), a−s(t)× ai(t, a′s × a−s)] ≥ pi[as(t), a−s(t)× ai(t, as × a−s)]

Lemma 2: All action plan profiles for sophisticated players with which myopic players switch
from A to B are strictly dominated:
ABM ∩ Us = ∅
Proof.
Suppose that ×s∈Sas ∈ ABM , then there are two points in time t1 and t2 with t1 < t2 such
that myopic players choose A at time t1 and B at time t2 . Find the first switching period
ts ∈ (t1, t2] such that A is chosen in the interval [t1, ts), but B is chosen at time ts. Since
all myopic players share the same history, the value of ts will be the same for each myopic
player so no myopic player will choose A in the interval [t1, ts). If a myopic player observed
all other sophisticated players choosing A in the interval [t1, ts), the fictitious play rule would
imply that xi(ts) ≥ xi(t1) therefore if A was optimal at time t1 it will also be optimal at time
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ts, contradicting the definition of ts. Therefore if a myopic player chooses B at time ts, at
least one sophisticated player must be choosing B in the interval [t1, ts), that is as(t) = 0 for
some s ∈ S and t ∈ [t1, ts). Denote the action plan of this sophisticated player by a˜s. We
will show that a˜s is dominated by an action plan a
′
s that prescribes A in the entire interval
[t1, ts) and is otherwise the same as a˜s. First, the sum of payoff flows generated by a
′
s in
the interval [t1, ts) is strictly higher than that generated by a˜s because all myopic players are
choosing A in this interval, and therefore Assumption 2 implies that the threshold will be
exceeded. Second, payoffs generated in the interval (ts, T ] will be equal or higher than those
of a˜s because myopic players will hold higher beliefs if a
′
s is chosen (due to more A choices
being observed) and consequently Lemma 1 implies that higher beliefs will lead to weakly
higher payoffs for the sophisticated player at any time t > ts.

Lemma 3: ∂tˆ2(y)∂y > 1.
Proof.
Use the definition of tˆ2(y) from equation (25):
tˆ2(y) =
log( 1n−1 − I−1)− log(γ−y 1n−1 − γT
′
I−1)
log(γ)
The partial derivative is calculated as follows:
∂tˆ2(y)
∂y
=
1
− log(γ) ×
1
γ−y 1n−1 − γT ′I−1
× γ−y −1
n− 1 log(γ) =
=
γ−y 1n−1
γ−y 1n−1 − γT ′I−1
> 1

Lemma 4:
Π1(y
∗, y∗) ≥ Π(y, y∗),∀y ∈ [0, T ] ⇔

Π1(y
∗, y∗) ≥ Π2(0, y∗)
Π1(y
∗, y∗) ≥ Π1(y, y∗), ∀y ∈ [y′′, y′]
Π1(y
∗, y∗) ≥ Π4(T, y∗)
If tˆ3(y
∗) ≤ T , y′ = tˆ3(y∗), otherwise y′ solves tˆ1(y′, y∗) = T . If tˆ2(0) > y∗, y′′ = 0, otherwise
y′′ solves tˆ2(y′′) = y∗.
Proof. To specify the deviation payoff, Π(y, y∗), we will first look at deviations upwards
(y > y∗) and then at deviations downwards (y < y∗). First, consider a deviation upwards
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to a strategy y = yD > y
∗. The calculation of payoff Π(yD, y∗) depends on the size of the
deviation: if yD is sufficiently small, the payoff is determined by Π(yD, y
∗) = Π1(yD, y∗),
but if y is large, myopic players may switch to A prior to y (see an illustration in figure 10,
panel a), or myopic players may never switch to A (figure 10, panel b). The first option is
possible only if the myopic players switch to A without ever observing player s choose A,
that is if tˆ3(y
∗) < T . Then the deviation payoffs for an action plan yD ∈ (tˆ3(y∗), T ] are
calculated by Π3(yD, y
∗). But Π3(y, y∗) is decreasing in y, thus any strategy in this interval
would be strictly dominated by strategy y = tˆ3(y
∗). In figure 10 we indicate dominance with
an arrow pointing towards the dominant strategy. Checking for profitable deviations upwards
therefore only requires checking for potential deviations in the interval (y∗, tˆ3(y∗)]. Also
note that yD ≤ tˆ3(y¯) together with condition I1 imply that deviation payoffs for strategies
yD ∈ (0, tˆ3(y¯)) are equal to Π1(yD, y∗).
The second possibility is that tˆ3(y
∗) ≥ T , so that myopic players do not switch prior to T
if they observe only n − m − 1 sophisticated players switching at y∗ (see figure 10, panel
b). Then because tˆ1(T, y
∗) = tˆ3(y∗) > T , tˆ1(y∗, y∗) < T (from condition I1) and tˆ1(·, y∗) is
continuous, there must be a number y′ ∈ (y∗, T ) such that tˆ1(y′, y∗) = T . If yD ∈ (y∗, y′],
(22a) is satisfied and Π(yD, y
∗) = Π1(yD, y∗), because tˆ1(y, y∗) ≤ T , tˆ2(yD) > yD > y∗ and
tˆ3(y
∗) > T > y∗. The payoff from any yD > y′ is determined by Π4(y, y∗) = yL, and thus
all strategies yD ∈ (y′, T ] are dominated by yD = T . Overall, to check for the existence
of an interior equilibrium it is sufficient to compare equilibrium payoffs to the payoffs from
yD ∈ (y∗, y′) ∪ T .
yD
Panel (a): tˆ3(y
∗) ≤ T
Π(yD, y
∗) =
yD
Panel (b): tˆ3(y
∗) > T
0 y′′ y∗ tˆ3(y¯) T 0 y
′′ y∗ y′ T
Π2(yD, y
∗) Π1(yD, y∗) Π3(yD, y∗) Π2(yD, y∗) Π1(yD, y∗) Π4(yD, y∗)
Figure 10: Calculation of deviation payoffs, Π(yD, y
∗) for every possible value of yD. Green
dashed line and green ticks mark undominated strategies. Red arrows mark dominated strate-
gies and the arrow points to the dominant strategy.
Now consider a possible deviation downwards to yD < y
∗. If yD is only slightly below y∗,
the switching period is tˆ1(yD, y
∗) and the deviation payoffs are Π1(yD, y∗). But if yD is low
enough, myopic players may switch to A prior to y∗, at time tˆ2(yD). If this does not happen,
that is if tˆ2(0) > y
∗, payoffs from all deviations downwards are calculated by Π1(yD, y∗).
Otherwise, if tˆ2(0) ≤ y∗, there will be some value y′′ that satisfies tˆ2(y′′) = y∗. For any y
below this value, payoffs will be determined by Π2(y, y
∗). From Lemma 3, any y ∈ (0, y′′) is
dominated by y = 0, therefore to check if there are any profitable deviations downwards it is
necessary to compare equilibrium payoffs to payoffs from strategies yD ∈ (y′′, y∗) ∪ 0.
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Lemma 5: Π1(y
∗, y∗) ≥ Π1(y, y∗), ∀y ∈ (y′′, y′), if and only if condition I2 is satisfied:
log(n−m−H/L
I−1(n−1) )
log(γ)
− T ′ > 0, (I2)
Proof.
We will calculate the first derivative of the profit function and determine under what con-
ditions the derivative at the equilibrium point is equal to 0 and the second derivative is is
non-positive, which ensures that the equilibrium is a maximum point and there are no incen-
tives to deviate to strategies in the nearest neighbourhood. Instead of taking the derivative
of the profit function, we will first transform it by applying a strictly increasing function
−γ(·/H), which preserves the sign of the derivative when γ ∈ (0, 1). The transformed payoff
function is calculated as follows:
−γΠ(y,y∗)/H = −γyL/H+Tγ−tˆ1(y,y∗) =
=
1
I−1 − n−mn−1
(γy(L/H−1)+T
1
n− 1 + γ
yL/H+T−y∗ n−m− 1
n− 1 − γ
yL/H+T+T ′I−1) =
=
γyL/H+T
I−1 − n−mn−1
(γ−y
1
n− 1 + γ
−y∗ n−m− 1
n− 1 − γ
T ′I−1) (31)
where γ tˆ1(y,y−i) has been substituted from (19). Differentiate the transformed profit function
in (31) with respect to y to get
∂ − γΠ(y,y∗)/H
∂y
=
log(γ)
I−1 − n−mn−1
× (γyL/H+T−y 1
n− 1(L/H − 1)+
+ γyL/H+T−y
∗ n−m− 1
n− 1 L/H − γ
yL/H+T+T ′I−1L/H) =
=
log(γ)γyL/H+T
I−1 − n−mn−1
(
γ−y
1
n− 1(L/H − 1) + γ
−y∗ n−m− 1
n− 1 L/H − γ
T ′I−1L/H
)
(32)
The first derivative is non-negative if:
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∂ − γΠ(y,y∗)/H
∂y
≥ 0 ⇔
γ−y
L/H − 1
n− 1 + γ
−y∗ n−m− 1
n− 1 L/H − γ
T ′I−1L/H ≥ 0 ⇔
γ−y ≤ γ
−y∗(n−m−1n−1 )− γT
′
I−1
H/L−1
n−1
(33)
The first derivative at point y = y∗ is non-negative if:
∂ − γΠ(y,y∗)/H
∂y
∣∣∣∣∣
y=y∗
≥ 0 ⇔
γ−y
∗H/L− 1
n− 1 ≤ γ
−y∗(
n−m− 1
n− 1 )− γ
T ′I−1 ⇔
γT
′+y∗ ≤ n−m−H/L
I−1(n− 1) ⇔
y∗ ≥
log(n−m−H/L
I−1(n−1) )
log(γ)
− T ′ (34)
The derivative is equal to 0 only if y∗ satisfies (34) with equality:
y∗ =
log(n−m−H/L
I−1(n−1) )
log(γ)
− T ′ (35)
There will be at most one y∗ that satisfies (35) for any given set of parameters, therefore
there can be at most one interior equilibrium in a given game, and the equilibrium strategy is
determined by equation (35). A necessary condition for the existence of an interior equilibrium
is 0 < y∗ < T . But note that condition I1 from Proposition 5 implies that y∗ < T because
y∗ < tˆ1(y∗, y∗), therefore the only additional condition is that y∗ > 0.
Condition I2:
log(n−m−H/L
I−1(n−1) )
log(γ)
− T ′ > 0
The second derivative is obtained by differentiating (32) with respect to y:
∂2 − γΠ(y,y∗)/H
∂y2
=
log(γ)2γyL/H+T
I−1 − n−mn−1
× (γ−y 1
n− 1(L/H − 1)
2+
+ γ−y
∗ n−m− 1
n− 1 (L/H)
2 − γT ′I−1(L/H)2) (36)
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The second order derivative is negative if:
∂2 − γΠ(y,y∗)/H
∂y2
< 0 ⇔
γ−y
1
n− 1(L/H − 1)
2 + γ−y
∗ n−m− 1
n− 1 (L/H)
2 − γT ′I−1(L/H)2 > 0 (37)
If condition I2 is satisfied, the expression of y∗ in (35) can be used to rewrite (37) as follows:
γy
∗−y >
L
L−H (38)
Because L < H and γ ∈ (0, 1), condition (38) is satisfied for all y. The first order condition
is therefore both necessary and sufficient for y = y∗ to be a local maximum point. Moreover,
equation (38) states that the second derivative is negative not only at y = y∗, but also for any
other value of y. Since the first derivative is equal to 0 at point y = y∗, and it is decreasing
at all y, the payoff function must be increasing at any point y < y∗ and decreasing at any
point y > y∗. Continuity of the profit function therefore implies that y = y∗ is not only a
local, but also a global maximum in the interval (y′′, y) as long as condition I2 is satisfied.

Lemma 6: Π1(y
∗, y∗) ≥ Π2(0, y∗) if and only if condition I3 is satisfied:
tˆ1(y
∗, y∗)− y∗L/H ≤ tˆ2(0), (I3)
Proof.
Use the profit specification in (13) to get the following expressions for the two profit functions:
Π1(y
∗, y∗) = yL+ (T − tˆ1(y∗, y∗))H
Π2(0, y
∗) = (T − tˆ2(0))H
There are no incentives to deviate to y = T if the former expression exceeds the latter:
Π1(y
∗, y∗) ≥ Π2(0, y∗) ⇔ tˆ1(y∗, y∗)− y∗L/H ≤ tˆ2(0)

Lemma 7: Π1(y
∗, y∗) ≥ Π4(T, y∗) if and only if condition I4 is satisfied:
tˆ1(y
∗, y∗)− y∗L/H ≤ T (1− L/H), (I4)
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Proof.
From (13), deviation payoffs are as follows:
Π4(T, y
∗) = TL
There are no incentives to deviate to y = T if
Π1(y
∗, y∗) ≥ Π4(T, y∗) ⇔ tˆ1(y∗, y∗)− y∗L/H ≤ T (1− L/H)

Lemma 8: Π1(0, 0) ≥ Π1(y, 0), ∀y ∈ [0, y′) if and only if condition T1 is satisfied:
n−m−H/L
n− 1 ≤ γ
T ′I−1 (T1)
where y′ solves tˆ1(y′, 0) = T .
Proof.
Payoffs for any y ∈ [0, y′) are calculated the following way, from equation (22a):
Π1(y, 0) = yL+ (T − tˆ1(y, 0))H (39)
A necessary condition for the payoff to be maximized at y = 0 is the non-positive sign of the
first derivative of (39) with respect to y at y = 0. We first apply a strictly increasing function
−γ(·/H) to the payoff function an then differentiate the transformed function with respect to
y to obtain the following condition:
∂ − γΠ1(y,0)/H
∂y
≤ 0 ⇔
log(γ)γT
I−1 − n−mn−1
× γ−y( 1
n− 1(L/H − 1) +
n−m− 1
n− 1 L/H − γ
T ′I−1L/H) ≤ 0 ⇔
γ−y
1
n− 1(L/H − 1) +
n−m− 1
n− 1 L/H − γ
T ′I−1L/H ≤ 0 (40)
Inequality (40) must hold for y = 0:
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∂ − γΠ1(y,0)/H
∂y
∣∣∣∣∣
y=0
≤ 0 ⇔
1
n− 1(L/H − 1) +
n−m− 1
n− 1 L/H − γ
T ′I−1L/H ≤ 0 ⇔
L/H
n−m
n− 1 −
1
n− 1 ≤ γ
T ′I−1L/H ⇔
n−m−H/L
n− 1 ≤ γ
T ′I−1 (41)
To obtain the second derivative, differentiate the the left-hand side of (40) with respect to y
and simplify to get:
∂2 − γΠ1(y,0)/H
∂y2
=
1
n− 1(L/H − 1)(−1) log γ
Note that the second derivative is always negative because γ ≤ 1 and H > L. If condition
T1 is satisfied, the first derivative will be non-positive at point y = 0, and it will non-positive
for any y ∈ (0, t′). Payoffs would therefore be maximized by choosing y = 0. If T1 does not
hold, the first derivative is positive at point y = 0 and profits could be increased by choosing
y > 0.

Lemma 10. tˆ1(y, y¯) ≤ tˆ2(y) and tˆ1(y, y¯) ≤ tˆ3(y¯)
Proof.
Note that tˆ1(y, y¯) is increasing both in y and in y¯, from equation (20). If y is held constant,
at any given time t the maximum value of tˆ1(y, y¯) will be reached at y¯ = t. Substituting y¯ = t
into equation (17) reduces it to equation (24), thus maxy¯ tˆ1(y, y¯) = tˆ2(y). Likewise, setting
y = t in equation (17) reduces it to equation (27), thus maxy tˆ1(y, y¯) = tˆ3(y¯). Therefore
tˆ1(y, y¯) can never exceed tˆ2(y) or tˆ3(y¯).

A.3 Comparative Statics
A.3.1 Speed of Transition in the Teaching Equilibrium
We will prove the effect of the parameter changes on the general function tˆ1(y, y), and all
results will of course hold for the special case y = 0.
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Lemma 11. Speed of transition to the efficient state in a teaching equilibrium depends on
the parameter values the following way:
1. ∂tˆ1(y,y)∂y > 0
2. ∂tˆ1(y,y)∂m > 0
3. ∂tˆ1(y,y)∂T ′ > 0
Proof.
Assume that a teaching equilibrium exists, so that tˆ1(0, 0) < T and
n−m
n−1 > I
−1. We will
show how the speed of transition in this type of equilibrium respond to changes in parameter
values. The switching period tˆ1(y, y) is calculated using equation (20):
tˆ1(y, y) =
1
− log(γ)
[
log(γ−y
n−m
n− 1 − γ
T ′I−1)− log(n−m
n− 1 − I
−1)
]
(42)
1. Derivative with respect to y:
∂tˆ1(y, y)
∂y
=
n−m
n−1
n−m
n−1 − γy+T ′I−1
(43)
∂tˆ1(y,y)
∂y > 0 because
n−m
n−1 > I
−1 and γ ∈ (0, 1).
2. Derivative with respect to m:
∂tˆ1(y, y)
∂m
= − 1
log(γ)
1
n− 1(
1
n−m
n−1 − I−1
− 1n−m
n−1 − γT ′+yI−1
) =
= − 1
log(γ)
1
n− 1
I−1(1− γT ′+y)
(n−mn−1 − I−1)(n−mn−1 − γT ′+yI−1)
(44)
∂tˆ1(y,y)
∂m > 0 because
n−m
n−1 > I
−1 and γ ∈ (0, 1).
3. Derivative with respect to T’:
∂tˆ1(y, y)
∂T ′
= − 1
log(γ)
1
γ−y n−mn−1 − γT ′I−1
×−I−1γT ′ log(γ) (45)
∂tˆ1(y,y)
∂T ′ > 0 because
n−m
n−1 > I
−1 and γ ∈ (0, 1).

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A.3.2 Speed of Transition in the Interior Equilibrium
Lemma 12. Speed of transition to the efficient state in an interior equilibrium depends on
the parameter values the following way:
1.
∂tˆ1(y
∗, y∗)
∂m
> 0
2.
∂tˆ1(y
∗, y∗)
∂T ′
= −1
Proof.
Assume that an interior equilibrium exists, so that tˆ1(y
∗, y∗) < T and n−mn−1 > I
−1. In an
interior equilibrium changes in parameter values affect both the equilibrium strategies of
sophisticated players and the switching period of myopic players, holding the strategies of
sophisticated players constant. To measure the total effect we substitute the expression of y∗
from equation (35) into (42) to obtain the following result:
tˆ1(y
∗, y∗) =
1
− log(γ)
[
log
(
I−1(n− 1)γT ′
n−m−H/L
n−m
n− 1 − γ
T ′I−1
)
− log
(
n−m
n− 1 − I
−1
)]
=
=
1
− log(γ)
[
log(H/L) + log(γT
′
) + log(I−1)− log(n−m−H/L)− log
(
n−m
n− 1 − I
−1
)]
1. Derivative with respect to m:
∂tˆ1(y
∗, y∗)
∂m
= − 1
log(γ)
(
1
n−m−H/L +
n− 1
n−m
n−1 − I−1
)
(46)
∂tˆ1(y∗,y∗)
∂m > 0 because
n−m
n−1 > I
−1, γ ∈ (0, 1) and n − m − H/L > 0 (if an interior
equilibrium exists).
2. Derivative with respect to T ′:
∂tˆ1(y
∗, y∗)
∂T ′
= −1 (47)

A.3.3 Speed of Transition if One Player is Teaching
Here we will calculate how the parameters of interest affect tˆ2(0), which measures the tran-
sition speed if a single sophisticated player always plays A while all others play B. This
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derivative is necessary for Proposition 9 and Proposition 10 because the existence of a delay
equilibrium depends on tˆ2(0)
Lemma 13. Speed of transition to the efficient state if only one sophisticated player is choos-
ing A depends on the parameter values the following way:
1.
∂tˆ2(0)
∂m
= 0
2.
∂tˆ2(0)
∂T ′
> 0
Proof.
Suppose that tˆ2(0) < T , which holds only if
1
n−1 > I
−1. Then tˆ2(0) is calculated the following
way, from expression 25:
tˆ2(0) =
log( 1n−1 − I−1)− log( 1n−1 − γT
′
I−1)
log(γ)
(48)
1. Derivative with respect to m:
∂tˆ2(0)
∂m
= 0 (49)
2. Derivative with respect to T ′:
∂tˆ2(0)
∂T ′
=
γT
′I−1
1
n−1 − γT ′I−1
(50)
∂tˆ2(0)
∂T ′ > 0 because
1
n−1 > I
−1.

A.3.4 Equilibrium Strategies in the Interior Equilibrium
Another variable if interest is the strategy used by sophisticated players in an interior equi-
librium, y∗, which has an effect on the existence conditions of the interior equilibrium.
Lemma 14. The strategies used by sophisticated players in an interior equilibrium depend
on parameter values the following way:
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1.
∂y∗
∂m
> 0
2.
∂y∗
∂T ′
= −1
In addition:
3.
∂y∗
∂m
<
∂tˆ1(y
∗, y∗)
∂m
Proof.
Equilibrium strategy is determined by equation (35):
y∗ =
log(n−m−H/L
I−1(n−1) )
log(γ)
− T ′
1. Derivative with respect to m:
∂y∗
∂m
= − 1
log(γ)
(
1
n−m−H/L) (51)
∂y∗
∂m > 0 because n−m−H/L > 0 (because an interior equilibrium exists).
2. Derivative with respect to T ′:
∂y∗
∂T ′
= −1 (52)
3. Comparison to the derivative of tˆ1(y
∗, y∗):
Recall the derivative of tˆ1(y
∗, y∗) from equation (46):
∂tˆ1(y
∗, y∗)
∂m
= − 1
log(γ)
(
1
n−m−H/L +
n− 1
n−m
n−1 − I−1
)
The derivative of y∗ calculated in (51) is strictly lower than the derivative of tˆ1(y∗, y∗)
because n−1n−m
n−1 −I−1
> 0.

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